After a long season of plunder, a pirate team of five Prudent Pirates has amassed a booty of 500 golden coins. Before they part their ways, the five decide to divide the treasure.

They that they will each propose a division strategy in order of their seniority: first the oldest pirate will propose the strategy for the division of coins. All five will then vote on it, and if at least half vote "Yes", the strategy will be used to divide the coins. If the majority rejects the plan however, the oldest pirate will be killed, and the whole process will be repeated with the remaining pirates, with the second oldest proposing his strategy.

Since all the pirates are very prudent, each one will want to claim as many coins for himself without getting killed. Given this, how many coins will each of the pirates (5 - 1, with 5 being the oldest) get, and why? What strategy will the oldest pirate propose?

imagine the five pirates as greedy investors in the stock markey(croocked accounts not to be mean but with reccent problems these pirates are just like them) lets give all the pirates a number pirate 1-5 1 being the youngest being the least and 5 being the oldest being the greatest. pirate 5 tells the pirates he'll give pirates 1,2, the most money to who ever kills the most of the other two pirates. pirates 1 and 2 agree therefore making the vote 3:2 pirates 1,2,3,4 all start fighting causing

Posted by crazy-kook on 2002-09-06 16:35:46