After a long season of plunder, a pirate team of five Prudent Pirates has amassed a booty of 500 golden coins. Before they part their ways, the five decide to divide the treasure.

They that they will each propose a division strategy in order of their seniority: first the oldest pirate will propose the strategy for the division of coins. All five will then vote on it, and if at least half vote "Yes", the strategy will be used to divide the coins. If the majority rejects the plan however, the oldest pirate will be killed, and the whole process will be repeated with the remaining pirates, with the second oldest proposing his strategy.

Since all the pirates are very prudent, each one will want to claim as many coins for himself without getting killed. Given this, how many coins will each of the pirates (5 - 1, with 5 being the oldest) get, and why? What strategy will the oldest pirate propose?

(In reply to I beg to differ by pleasance)

While that would be true for a life scenario, and anyone would probably vote to kill the greedy old guy whether he offered them nothing or one coin, that is not the point in this problem. It is explicitly stated that each pirate will want to claim as many coins as he can without getting killed. Given that, as the problem states, the oldest pirate will walk away with nearly everything, as in the given solution.

Posted by DJ on 2003-05-01 09:39:52